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ABSTRACT 
For the patent owner, early provision of patent notice can help 
maximize recoverable infringement damages during subsequent 
litigation.   This iBrief recognizes a growing trend of infringement 
suits predicated on patented enterprise software technology, and 
analyzes application of patent notice principles against industry 
convention.  This iBrief examines the licensing paradigm of 
enterprise software and questions whether mechanical compliance 
with the marking statute should qualify as constructive notice.  
Borrowing from analogous Federal Circuit principles, this iBrief 
concludes by proposing alternate notice theories that would 
empower patentees to seek increased remedies consistent with 
industry reality, case law, and fundamental statutory purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 For the patent owner, early provision of patent notice can help 
maximize recoverable infringement damages during litigation.  The 
interplay of industry convention and enforcement strategy typically informs 
the particular manner chosen by the patentee to effect such notice.  In the 
enterprise software2 industry, patentees face unique notice considerations 
posed by a distribution paradigm restricting access to software products.  
Such restricted access hides software products and patent listings therein 
from the public, and thus may preclude compliance with the marking 
statute.  Nonetheless, patentees of enterprise software can still assert 
                                                     
1 J.D., University of California at Davis King Hall School of Law; B.S. in 
Electrical Engineering, University of California at Los Angeles.  The author 
currently serves as Director of Intellectual Property, Legal Affairs for Siebel 
Systems, Inc.  This iBrief reflects the present beliefs of the author and should 
not be attributed to past, current, or future employers or clients.  The author 
thanks Mr. Brett Stohs and the staff of the Duke Law & Technology Review for 
their editorial assistance. 
2 The term “enterprise software” generally means software intended for an 
enterprise.  One meaning of “enterprise” is a business organization.  E.g., 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/e/enterprise.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005); 
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Thereon). 
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alternative notice theories to preserve legal remedies consistent with case 
law and fundamental statutory purpose.  As high-stakes patent litigation in 
the enterprise software industry continues to grow,3 so too will strategic 
application of notice principles to optimize the potential scope of 
recoverable patent damages.4 
I. SHOULD PATENT LISTINGS ON ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE QUALIFY 
AS MARKING? 
A. The Marking Statute and Its Purposes 
¶2 Section 287(a) of title 35 in the United States Code (“section 287” 
or the “marking statute”), permits patentees to “mark” a product when the 
product embodies patented technology.5  The patentee “marks” the product 
“either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.’, 
together with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the 
article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or 
more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.”6  Compliant 
marking of patented products is a form of constructive notice to infringers, 
allowing recovery of full patent damages sustained after provision of such 
notice.7  
                                                     
3 See Steven Andersen, IP Law Comes of Age: IP Enters the No-Holds-Barred 
World of Complex Business Litigation, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2004, at 48, 
53 (noting a “spike” in the number of software patent cases).   
4 Patent damages can be lost profits or reasonable royalties.  See Panduit Corp. 
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978); 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 
(S.D. N.Y. 1970). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).  The marking statute states in pertinent part: 
 
Patentees . . . making, offering for sale, or selling . . . any patented 
article . . . may give notice to the public that the same is patented, either 
by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.”, together 
with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the 
article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein 
one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.  In 
the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the 
patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the 
infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe 
thereafter . . . . 
 
Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.   Under section 287, infringers are liable for patent damages no later than 
when they are notified of the patent.  See infra ¶ 21 (explaining that damages 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 2 
¶3 As found by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, the related purposes of the marking statute are: 
1. Helping to avoid innocent infringement; 
2. Encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that 
the article is patented; and 
3. Aiding the public to identify whether an article is 
patented.8 
The public may rely on the absence of patent marking on an article to 
signify that the article may be freely reproduced.9  According to the 
Supreme Court, the marking statute most fundamentally helps protect 
against deceptive distribution of unmarked, patented articles that the public 
could mistakenly believe are in the public domain.10
¶4 The marking statute allows patentees some discretion regarding the 
marking’s placement.  Marking is permitted on packaging instead of the 
article itself when the latter is physically impossible.11  Package marking 
may also be permitted when, “for reasons that go to the very purpose of the 
statute, marking the article itself would not provide sufficient notice to the 
                                                                                                                       
liability can sometimes begin prior to receipt of notice).  Compliance with the 
marking statute requires consistently marking substantially all of the patented 
products.  Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537-38 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993).  Section 287 recognizes the patentee’s filing of an action for 
infringement as one kind of actual notice.  § 287(a).  Another kind of actual 
notice is receipt of a patentee’s letter alleging infringement.  See Lans v. Digital 
Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (requiring that actual 
notice be an “affirmative act on the part of the patentee which informs the 
defendant of infringement”).       
8 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  In 
describing the purpose for the marking statute and its subsequent revisions, the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) has remarked that 
“[t]he legislative history … implies that the protection of the public probably 
was the strongest factor leading to the passage of the patent marking statutes.”  
Memorandum from Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Patent Litigation Committee Chair, and 
Mark Schuman, Patent Marking Subcommittee Chair, on Patent Marking Statute 
35 U.S.C. § 287(a), to AIPLA Patent Litigation & Patent Law Committee 
Members 7 (April 9, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law & Technology Review). 
9 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989). 
10 Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936) 
(“Under the interpretation which we accept, § 4900, R.S., [the predecessor to 
section 287] . . . provides protection against deception by unmarked patented 
articles, and requires nothing unreasonable of patentees.”). 
11 § 287(a) (providing that patent notice should appear on the product but “when, 
from the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the 
package wherein one of more of them is contained” a similar notice).   
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public.”12  However, when the patented article has other writings, the patent 
listing must appear on the article.13 
B. The Reality of Enterprise Software Access 
¶5 Distribution and use of enterprise software are subject to significant 
restrictions.  Unlike off-the-shelf consumer software for purchase by 
virtually anyone, the availability of an enterprise software license largely 
depends on the software owner’s preferences and policies.  A typical 
enterprise license grants a customer, including its employees and sometimes 
others, limited rights to use the enterprise software under various terms and 
conditions.14  As a competitive safeguard, enterprise software owners 
typically discourage or forbid rival companies from licensing or otherwise 
accessing their products.  
¶6 Even when a customer is found to qualify as a permitted licensee, 
the enterprise license may still restrict the scope of potential end users.  
While contractual provisions for enterprise software use are as varied as 
software products themselves, a few contractual restrictions commonly 
appear in these licenses: 
                                                     
12 Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
13 Id. at 163 (“Where the patented article has markings or printing on it, other 
than the appropriate patent marking, then the alternate form of patent marking 
on the package is not sufficient compliance with the statute.”); Pierre Yanney, 
The Patent Marking Statute, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, July 2001, at 16, 
16 (citing Creative Pioneer Prods. Corp. v. K-Mart Corp., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841, 
1847-48 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (mem. and order on damages) for the proposition that 
patent marking on packaging when an article contains other printing does not 
comply with the marking statute).  The Rutherford court further explained: 
 
The rationale behind stricter conformity to the marking provisions of    
§ 287 when the article contains other markings is bound-up with the 
purpose of the statute to give notice to the public.  Where the public 
finds markings or writings upon the article itself, the public should be 
able to rely upon the fact that a patent, if it exists, should also be noted 
with that writing.  The notice required by the statute is most effective 
when it can be easily seen by the users of the article. 
 
Rutherford, 803 F. Supp. at 163-64.   
14  See, e.g., Oracle License and Services Agreement § C, at 
http://www.awaretechnologies.com/aware.pdf/2.6/OLSA.pdf (form agreement) 
(“You may allow your agents and contractors to use the programs for this 
purpose and you are responsible for their compliance with this agreement in 
such use.”). 
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• Transferability:  Licenses that are deemed personal 
often forbid the customer’s transfer or assignment of 
rights to others.15   
• End User Restrictions: Licenses may restrict the 
potential pool of end users to, for example, only those 
customer employees specifically named in the license 
or to a maximum number of unnamed concurrent 
users.16 
• Confidentiality:  Licenses often characterize enterprise 
software as the licensor’s proprietary information that 
cannot be divulged by the licensee or its end users.17  
Under such a nondisclosure obligation, the licensee 
may be forbidden from disclosing information 
regarding the screens, functionality, code, business 
                                                     
15  See, e.g., id. § D (“You may not . . . make the programs or materials resulting 
from the services available in any manner to any third party . . . .”).  
16  See David M. Ewalt, Price-Hike Surprise, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 27, 
2003, at 24, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=15600387 
(noting industry adoption of licensing provisions based on concurrent users and 
named users).  Prices charged for an enterprise software license are often 
proportional to the number of licensed end users.  See id. (identifying 
controversy over pricing schema based on concurrent users versus named users).  
Many other restrictions on use may exist.  For example, the enterprise software 
may be licensed on a per server or per site basis.  See, e.g., New Oracle Site 
License, I.T. Times, Dec. 1995, at 
http://ittimes.ucdavis.edu/v4n4dec95/oracle.html (announcing new Oracle site 
license).  License termination can require the licensee to stop all access and use 
of the product on certain conditions.  See, e.g., Software License Agreement 
between Informix Software, Inc. and GeoCities § E(2)(a) (signed June 30, 
1998), at 
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/geocities/informix.lic.1998.0
6.30.html. 
17 See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON COMPUTER LAW § 6.24[A] (Supp. 2001).  
The exact language of the confidentiality provision varies.  Some provisions 
may categorically require secrecy over the entire software product.  Other 
provisions may carve out from the restriction information that is or becomes part 
of the public domain without fault of the licensee.  See, e.g., Software License 
and Services Agreement between Blue Martini Software, Inc. and Bluefly Inc., § 
10, at http://contracts.onecle.com/bluefly/martini.lic.2002.03.12.shtml 
(identifying, for example, “know-how, processes, apparatuses, equipment, 
algorithms, software programs, software source documents, and formulae 
related to the current, future and proposed products and services of each of the 
parties” as confidential information). 
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process flows, and other components of the enterprise 
software.18   
¶7 Other protections prevent disclosure of enterprise software cloaked 
under these common restrictions.  When a license is purchased, enterprise 
software, as stored in a transportable medium, is often readied for direct 
delivery from a manufacturing facility to the customer.  In that situation, the 
product is typically packaged and boxed under seal for shipment whereby 
little, if anything, can be surmised about the enterprise software inside.  As 
another access control, “keys” may be confidentially provided to the 
customer to unlock only the paid-for, licensed portions of the software 
functionality embodied in the storage medium.  Keys help to prevent 
unpermitted access by both licensees and others.  Clearly, owners of 
enterprise software implement various measures to significantly restrict 
access to their product and, as a result, patent markings therein.19 
C.  Enterprise Software Marking and Unpromoted Statutory 
Purposes 
¶8 In the enterprise software context, the patented product to be 
marked, if any, is usually a storage device.20  Thus, marking under section 
                                                     
18 SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 6.24[A].  See, e.g., Software License and Services 
Agreement between Blue Martini Software, Inc. and Bluefly Inc., § 10, at 
http://contracts.onecle.com/bluefly/martini.lic.2002.03.12.shtml. 
19 See Ronald A. Cass, Copyright, Licensing, and the “First Screen”, 5 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 46 (1999) (noting that license terms are not 
unilaterally determined by licensors independent of licensee preferences). 
20 In the U.S., patent claims often recite a computer-readable medium as the 
statutory invention.  See Examination Guidelines For Computer-Related 
Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7482 (Feb. 28, 1996).  Other preambles from 
claims directed to software include, for example, “computer program product” 
and “program storage device.”  See Fenwick & West LLP, 2004 Report on 
International Legal Protection for Computer Software, 21 No. 4 COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAWYER 1, 5 (2004) (noting gradual international acceptance of 
program product claims).  There are other variations to claim software-related 
inventions as a manufacture (or machine) rather than a process.  See generally 
id.; Andrew J. Hollander, Patenting Computer Data Structures: The Ghost, the 
Machine and the Federal Circuit, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 33 (2003) 
(discussing patentability of data structures).  Such claims in the Beauregard style 
identify the invention as a computer-readable product and, as such, the article on 
which the marking must appear.  For a general discussion on patentable subject 
matter and the patentability of computer software, see generally Robert Plotkin, 
Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention: A Case for Software 
Patent Reform, 2003 U.C.L.A. J. L. & TECH. 7 (2003); Richard S. Gruner, 
Everything Old is New Again: Obviousness Limitations on Patenting Computer 
Updates of Old Designs, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 209 (2003); Sam S. Han, 
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287 could entail a patent notice appearing on a label for a CD or other 
favored storage medium.  However, perhaps because of space limitations or 
branding aesthetics, marking does not often appear on the CD label itself, 
the only practical area to mark “on” the CD.  Rather, the “on the article” 
requirement has led to patent listings in the user interface of the software.  
Marking frequently appears as a familiar splash screen upon launch of the 
enterprise software.  Marking can also appear in a drop box along with other 
legal notices or information.  At first blush, marking according to these 
conventions apparently complies with the letter of section 287 to achieve 
constructive notice.  However, resort to the purposes of the marking statute 
may better inform whether conventional marking of software should 
constitute constructive notice.   
¶9 As previously noted, the fundamental purpose of marking is to help 
avoid innocent infringement.21  With respect to non-licensees of enterprise 
software, marking does not help prevent innocent infringement because 
non-licensees lack access to reproduce the software product in the first 
place.  For example, direct shipment from the owner of enterprise software, 
which is sealed until opened by the intended customer-licensee, restricts 
non-licensees from access to the software product and its marking.  As 
another example, when marking involves patent listings on software 
screens, licensing terms contractually permit only licensees, or their agents, 
to access the software and patent notice therein.  Unlike the traditional entry 
of sold products into the free stream of commerce, there is no practical 
potential for the non-licensed public to witness enterprise software or its 
markings when commercialized in the conventional manner.22  Thus, hidden 
enterprise software and its markings do not influence the conduct of non-
licensees, much less help them avoid innocent infringement.23  
                                                                                                                       
Analyzing the Patentability of “Intangible” Yet ”Physical” Subject Matter, 3 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2002).     
21 Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936). 
22 Perkins Coie, Patent Marking: Avoid Losing an Infringement Suit Before It 
Begins, at www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/patent/091003.htm (Sept. 
10, 2003) (“But merely marking products with the patent numbers is not enough 
either – the products must also be shipped or sold so that others have notice of 
the patent protection.”).  
23 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 64-65 (2001) (identifying “several imperfections” with the 
marking statute including award of damages for innocent infringement by an 
infringer who does not actually encounter a patented product).  Of course, public 
disclosure of only a patent listing in a software product – by, for example, 
carving out the patent listing from contractual nondisclosure obligations – still 
does not serve the purpose of section 287 if the product otherwise remains off 
limits to the public.  Because the public lacks legitimate access to enterprise 
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¶10 In contrast, marking may theoretically help prevent innocent 
infringement with respect to enterprise software licensees.  However, other 
legal and contractual restrictions (e.g., copyright, confidentiality 
obligations, and license limitations)24 and related notices that typically 
appear more frequently in enterprise software also confer knowledge of 
proprietary rights therein and warn end users against illegal reproduction or 
further sale of the software.25  Thus, it is unclear how much patent marking 
actually contributes to preventing innocent infringement given preexisting 
appreciation of contractual limitations and the presence of other legal 
notices.26   
¶11 The other two purposes of section 287 – to encourage public notice 
about a patented article and to aid the public in identifying patented articles 
– also do not appear to be significantly furthered, if at all, by the marking of 
enterprise software.  As to the former purpose, in view of typical licensing 
provisions that restrict access to a limited set of permitted end users, public 
notice of patents covering the enterprise software is, as previously 
discussed, never achieved.27  Owners of enterprise software have 
deliberately elected product confidentiality to bolster competitiveness as the 
more important business objective over public marking access to increase 
patent damages.  As to the latter purpose, marking aids only a small fraction 
of the public: those relatively few licensees permitted to see the enterprise 
software during the course of their paid-for use.  
                                                                                                                       
software, regardless of marking accessibility, the public cannot be deceived into 
believing the software is free to copy. 
24 See supra Part I.B. 
25 Copyright vests in its owner the exclusive rights to, for example, reproduce, 
prepare derivative works of, and distribute the copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C.      
§ 106 (2000).  A patent vests in its owner the right to exclude others from, for 
example, making, using, and selling the patented technology.  35 U.S.C. § 271 
(2000).  Although the intellectual property theories differ in significant ways 
(e.g., non-abstract idea versus expression protection) in the enterprise software 
context, copyright and patent protections often vindicate the same primary 
business interest:  preventing unauthorized copying and sale.  See Final Report 
of the Nat’l Comm’n on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU) 16-18 (July 31, 1978), at http://digital-law-
online.info/CONTU/contu1.html.     
26 The general public (and even the bar) is arguably more familiar with the 
concept of copyright than patent.  See generally David A. Einhorn, Copyright 
and Patent Protection for Computer Software:  Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 
30 IDEA 265 (1990) (discussing both copyright and patent protections).  For 
this reason, copyright notices, which are far more ubiquitous than patent 
markings, are likely to better deliver warnings against misuse of proprietary 
enterprise software.   
27 See supra Part I.B. 
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¶12 In certain circumstances, courts have acknowledged that some 
discretion must be reserved in the patentee to choose the marking location.28  
Therefore, an enterprise software company could attempt to characterize 
marking on the software packaging as a permissible alternative to better 
serve the purposes of section 287.  However, this liberal interpretation of 
section 287 is still contrary to the underlying policy of the marking statute 
to avoid misleading the public into believing a product is free to copy.  
First, enterprise software does not sit on store shelves with packaging 
available for potential inspection by all.  Because logistics surrounding 
software delivery typically involve direct, sealed shipments from 
manufacturing facility to intended customer that limit access to package 
markings, such markings do not further the purposes of the marking statute 
any more than product markings.  Second, under applicable case law, 
package marking when the patented article contains other writings fails to 
comply with section 287.29  Because CD labels and software screens 
normally contain other printings, such as company name, copyright notice, 
and version information, marking on packaging instead of the product is 
likely impermissible for enterprise software.30 
¶13 The nature of enterprise software thus reveals discord between the 
core purpose of marking and the literal requirements of the marking 
statute.31  Specifically, marking does not prevent deception of the public 
into believing the enterprise software is in the public domain because, 
deprived of both the software and marking therein, the public cannot be 
deceived in the first place.32  With no access to conventional embodiments 
                                                     
28 See, e.g., Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 50 (1892) (stating that 
“something must be left to the judgment of the patentee”). 
29 Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
30 See supra ¶ 4.  The reservation or creation of a dedicated screen to list patents 
is presumably even easier than employing a CD label since screen design could 
provide more space for the marking.  Professor Chisum remarks that although 
the patent owner enjoys some discretion about where to mark, many courts have 
insisted on a showing of physical impossibility of marking on the product before 
marking is permitted elsewhere.  DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 
20.03[7][c][iii] (1999).  A patent notice on a CD (or in a screen generated by a 
computer instructions stored in the CD) unlike, for example, an integrated 
circuit, is not technically or commercially infeasible.  
31 Software poses many unique issues regarding the application of patent law.  
For example, interpretation of claim limitations under paragraph six of 42 
U.S.C. § 112 in the software context defies easy resolution.  See generally Tobi 
C. Clinton, Infringement and Software Claimed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6: 
Software Function is the Important Part, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2000).   
32 In analyzing sold products whose markings became invisible after product 
installation, a lower court characterized a limited class of people who could 
witness the markings before installation as the qualifying “public” under section 
287.  See Rutherford, 803 F. Supp. at 164 (“[T]he ‘public’ for which notice is 
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of enterprise software or possible patent marking therein, the public could 
not reasonably conclude that the software is in the public domain.33  
Further, when owners of enterprise software deliberately and selectively 
conceal access to their products and patent listings therein to all except 
licensees, notions of fairness call into question whether patentees should be 
allowed to, at the same time, charge the world with patent knowledge.34  
Despite speculation to the contrary,35 patentees that conventionally mark 
enterprise software CDs, or even their packaging, might not be entitled to 
collect infringement damages based on a constructive notice theory.36 
II. DISADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL NOTICE PRACTICE 
A.  Risk in Attempted Marking 
¶14 Since constructive notice is uncertain under even a liberal 
interpretation of section 287, enterprise software companies could 
reasonably decide that marking would serve little purpose.  In fact, marking 
could pose significant disadvantages.   
¶15 Myriad reasons, both legal and non-legal, exist to not mark patented 
enterprise software.  The sheer length of marking verbiage may 
detrimentally impact product aesthetics, perhaps an important marketing 
consideration.  Legal notices may add to apparent product complexity, the 
hallmark of a doomed offering in an industry increasingly committed to 
simplicity and user friendliness.37  Further, large patent portfolios and 
                                                                                                                       
provided are building contractors.”).  In Rutherford, no legal constraints limited 
theoretically broad access to those hidden markings, even if in practice few saw 
them.  In contrast, contractual and related legal obligations do foreclose broad 
access to markings on enterprise software. 
33 Toro Co. v. McCulloch Corp., 898 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (D. Minn. 1995) 
(explaining that “[i]f the device has not been released into public domain, there 
is manifestly no possibility of the public innocently copying or imitating that 
device”). 
34 Where license agreements prohibit access to patented products by the 
patentee’s competitors specifically, this question is especially relevant in 
considering what knowledge, if any, should be imputed to competitors, likely a 
primary infringement target of the patentee.  
35 See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 4.26[D] (instructing without explanation 
that marking should go on the program medium, its packaging, or both). 
36 Consideration of constructive notice should be a highly fact-intensive inquiry 
performed on a case-by-case basis with due regard for the nature and extent of 
the distribution and accessibility of the particular software offering at issue and 
the degree to which the objectives of section 287 regarding prevention of public 
deception are met. 
37 See, e.g., Press Release, FileMaker, Small Businesses Tell Software Makers: 
“Keep It Simple” (July 14, 2003), at 
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evolving product lines can make accurate association between a product and 
related patents a challenging task with potentially steep costs.  Error in a 
patent listing, which in litigation could be characterized as deception, can 
implicate significant statutory fines for violation of the false marking 
provision.38  In other countries false marking can even lead to criminal 
liability.39  Thus, for products that are distributed abroad, special 
consideration should be given to the desirability of marking and safeguards 
to ensure accuracy.    
¶16 Marking can also detrimentally expand the scope of litigation 
discovery to reach deep into the patentee’s product design and strategy.40  In 
a typical patent infringement suit, some information concerning a patentee’s 
product offerings can be probative.41  When the patentee’s products are 
marked, the markings are powerful admissions about the critical relevance 
of the marked products to the patent claims in suit and related construction 
issues.42  As a result, detailed and comprehensive discovery into marked 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.filemaker.com/releases/1030.html (announcing survey results that 
demonstrate user desire for simplicity over complexity in software products); 
SAP Info, The Software Works the Way I Do, No. 29 (June 3, 2000), at 
http://www.sap.info/index.php4?ACTION=noframe&url=http://www.sap.info/p
ublic/en/print.php4/article/comvArticle-193333c63b51c696a9/en (underscoring 
increasing user expectations about software ease of use and clarity); Scott 
Berkun, The Importance of Simplicity (July/August 1999) at 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-
us/dnhfact/html/humanfactor8_4.asp.     
38 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2000) (stating that false markings “for the purpose of 
deceiving the public” are punishable by fines of $500 for each offense.).   
39 Hal J. Bohner, Patent Marking: Why to do it and how to do it, INTELL. PROP. 
& TRADE REG. J., Spring 2003, at 1, 3; Gordon R. Moriarity, Patent Marking 
Principles, BOSTON E-NET, Fall 2000, at http://www.boston-
enet.org/newsletter/fall00-2.htm.  
40 See Douglas E. Lumish & Matthew M. Sarboraria, Preserving the Crown 
Jewels, Practical Strategies for Protecting Source Code in Patent Litigation 
Discovery, 5 PAT. STRAT. & MGMT. 1 (2004) (explaining the danger of software 
product source code disclosure in patent litigation discovery). 
41 For example, patent law requires the inventor to describe the best mode 
known at filing.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 
F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Comparison of a patentee’s commercial product 
against the patent in suit is probative, but not necessarily dispositive, of the best 
mode inquiry.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing discovery of relevant 
information “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence”).        
42 See Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 69 F.3d 554 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (affirming the summary judgment of an 
infringement ruling by the district court, stating that its “purported comparison 
of the accused device with an embodiment produced by the patentee” did not 
constitute reversible error).   
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products can become a virtual certainty, undesirably introducing evidence 
that, for example, could complicate an otherwise straightforward prima 
facie infringement showing by the patentee.43  Worse still, discovery 
expanded to encompass the patentee’s product could unveil product detail 
sufficient to support a patent counterclaim or separate suit by the accused 
infringer.  As a result, product marking could quickly turn the litigation tide 
against the patentee. 
B.  The Problem with Letters to Trigger Damages 
¶17 A conventional alternative to marking is the provision of a notice 
letter as actual, rather than constructive, notice to the accused when 
infringement arises.  Federal Circuit decisions teach that proper provision of 
actual notice requires (1) a charge of infringement (2) of specific patents (3) 
against a specific accused device or activity (4) by the patentee.44  Receipt 
by an accused infringer of a properly crafted notice letter can begin the 
period over which patent damages are recoverable.45   
¶18 However, the notice letter is necessarily delayed at least until the 
infringement is detected, which often comes well after the onset of 
infringement.  Software infringements, especially in the enterprise arena, 
can be uniquely difficult to detect.  Limited comprehension of software-
related accused devices based on, for example, their confidentiality and 
relative insusceptibility to reverse engineering, can render infringement 
detection a very formidable challenge.46 
                                                     
43 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2001) (noting that beyond intrinsic 
evidence, courts can consider anything helpful for claim construction as 
extrinsic evidence).  Determination of a patent infringement claim involves a 
two-step inquiry: (1) claim construction to determine the limits of the scope and 
the meaning of the asserted claims, and (2) comparison of the claims with the 
allegedly infringing devices or methods to determine whether the latter embody 
every limitation of the asserted claims.  See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 
138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Because claim construction is a question 
of law, the standard of review is de novo.  Id. at 1456.  The second step in 
determining whether an accused device or method infringes an asserted claim, 
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact, for 
which the standard of review is clear error.  See Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat 
Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
44 Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
45 Amsted Indus. Inc., 24 F.3d at 187. 
46 See, e.g., Jeff Moore, Sources for Patent Infringement Investigations and 
Patent Search Services on the Internet, at 
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¶19 Another significant disadvantage of notice letters is the potential 
creation of reasonable apprehension of suit, a jurisdictional predicate to a 
claim for declaratory relief.47  On that basis, a notice letter recipient, if first 
to file, is empowered to deprive the patentee of its desired judicial forum 
and otherwise sabotage its enforcement strategy.48  Notwithstanding 
industry attempts to carefully draft notice letters that simultaneously impart 
actual notice yet sidestep creation of a justiciable controversy, the Federal 
Circuit has refused to provide a safe harbor or other definitive guidance on 
how to trigger one without the other.49 
¶20 Notice letters therefore pose disadvantages to patent enforcement 
efforts.  From their causal dependence on the discovery of infringement, 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/bp98/moore.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 
2005) (discussing difficulty in, and resources for, detecting patent infringement). 
47 Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(regarding claims brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
2201).  The requirements for a declaratory judgment action are (1) a charge of 
infringement, or resort to the totality of circumstances, that puts the accused 
infringer under reasonable apprehension that the patentee will sue, and (2) an 
immediate intention and ability of the accused infringer to engage in activity that 
would be adversely impacted by the suit.  See id.    
48 See Peter J. Shurn III, Using Declaratory Judgments Offensively in Patent 
Cases, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.jmls.edu/ripl/vol3/issue1.htm.  The option to file first also allows the 
accused infringer, for example, to protect a new product offering, to protect 
reputation or image, to protect customers, to send a message to the industry, to 
bolster negotiating leverage, or to distract or confuse the patentee.  Id. at 13. 
49 See EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811-12 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  The 
Federal Circuit has acknowledged that the requirements for actual notice under 
section 287 are not coextensive with those for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
For example, a patentee’s offer to license a patent by itself – enough to trigger 
actual notice – is usually insufficient to create a justiciable controversy.  EMC 
Corp., 89 F.3d at 811-12.  However, inherent complexity in identification of a 
justiciable controversy renders uncertain even informed attempts to implicate 
section 287 without the Declaratory Judgment Act: 
 
This court’s two-part test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction is 
designed to police the sometimes subtle line between cases in which the 
parties have adverse interests and cases in which those adverse interests 
have ripened into a dispute that may properly be deemed a controversy. 
. . . In the end, the question is whether the relationship between the 
parties can be considered a “controversy,” and that inquiry does not 
turn on whether the parties have used particular “magic words” in 
communicating with one another. 
 
Id.      
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they fail to preserve a full measure of potential damages to secure complete 
justice for the patentee.50  Unintended implication of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act can also weigh against dispatch of notice letters. 
III. ALTERNATIVE CONTEXTUAL THEORIES TO OPTIMIZE DAMAGES 
A.  Impossibility of a Deceived Public 
¶21 If an attempt to mark enterprise software is deemed legally futile or 
otherwise undesirable, the patentee has other strategies to seek damages 
greater than those secured by notice letter alone.  For example, marking is 
not necessary for asserted method claims of a patent having no apparatus 
claims, even when the patentee markets a related product.51  As suggested 
by case law, when a patent contains both method and apparatus claims, and 
a patented product is amenable to marking, the product must be marked to 
achieve constructive notice, thereby starting the damages clock for any 
asserted claim.52  However, when the patentee does not sell any patented 
product at all, and there is no product to mark, full damages are recoverable 
from the onset of infringement without any notice.53 
                                                     
50 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 65 (2001) (stating that the actual notice requirement wastes 
social resources and provides incentive to knowingly infringe until the infringer 
receives actual notice). 
51 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 9.4(b) (4th ed. 
1998).  See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 
395 (1936) (“If respondent’s position is correct, process patents and patents 
under which nothing has been manufactured may be secretly infringed with 
impunity, notwithstanding injury to owners guilty of no neglect.”). This rule’s 
application deserves further consideration when a patent contains only method 
claims covering software product functionality, and with trivial modification 
could, but does not, also contain a product claim. 
52 Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (“Where the patent contains both apparatus and method claims, however, 
to the extent that there is a tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted 
method claims can be given, a party is obliged to do so if it intends to avail itself 
of the constructive notice provisions of section 287(a).”); Douglas J. Bucklin, 
Patent Marking Requirements – Patented Articles Must Be Marked as Patented 
in Order for Patentee to Recover Damages Due to Patent Infringement, 
FindLaw for Corporate Counsel (Dec. 19, 2002) (suggesting some ambiguity in 
case law), at  
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00305/008547/title/Subject/topic/Intell
ectual%20Property_Patents/filename/intellectualproperty_2_4593.                 
53 See, e.g., Wine Ry. Appliance Co., 297 U.S. at 398.  Others have also noted 
this result discouraging the sale of patented products.  E.g., Carl Oppedahl, 
Patent Marking Of Systems, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
205, 211 (1995) (“From this it will be appreciated that from the point of view of 
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¶22 One commentator explained the marking rationale as follows: 
A helpful jurisprudential model for § 287 . . . is that of estoppel or 
reliance: a patent owner who sells a patented product but does not 
mark it may be understood to have led the public to believe that it is 
not patented, and thus cannot be heard to complain for damages if a 
member of the public who has not been given actual notice of the 
patent chooses to copy the product.54
Likewise, when a patented product is not sold, the patent owner has not led 
the public into believing anything.  This reliance model makes sense for 
sold products and their markings that move freely through the stream of 
public commerce under the first sale or exhaustion doctrine55 to potentially 
impact public behavior.56
¶23 By contrast, the flow of licensed enterprise software including its 
markings is significantly constrained by contractual prohibitions forbidding 
movement.  From the public’s perspective, the inaccessibility of such 
enterprise software renders it essentially invisible.  The public therefore 
remains unaffected by a patent listing in a restricted software product it 
cannot witness.57 
                                                                                                                       
monetary damages and associated proof it is better as a patent owner never to 
have sold the patented product than to have sold it, since if no product has been 
sold, then damages will run from the start of the infringement.”). 
54 Oppedahl, supra note 53, at 11   
55 See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (“The unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority 
of the patentee, “exhausts” the patentee's right to control further sale and use of 
that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold.”).   
56 Professor Chisum also apparently emphasizes the importance of public 
impact, questioning a literal reading of section 287 when it conflicts with the 
fundamental purpose of the statute: 
 
Section 287 literally specifies “making or selling,” and it can be argued 
that marking is required even if the patentee neither sells nor authorizes 
others to sell (e.g. when a patent owner makes and uses a patented 
machine and sells only the unpatented products thereof), but that literal 
reading is contrary to the rationale behind the statute identified in Wine 
Railway, to wit, to protect against deception of the public by the 
distribution of unmarked patented articles. 
 
CHISUM, supra note 30, at § 20.03[7][c][ii] (emphasis in original).   
57 To the extent that limited licenses of enterprise software do not impact the 
public at large as outright sales of products do, licensing should not be deemed 
equivalent to “selling” under section 287.  Cf. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark 
Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (comparing license with sale 
in different on-sale bar context).      
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¶24 As proposed above, enterprise software markings in conventional 
embodiments do not likely serve a compelling public notice function.58  
Thus, a patentee providing enterprise software could cite an undeceived 
public to argue against a requirement of marking to recover full damages for 
any kind of claims in suit, whether method or apparatus, or both.59  
Although there appears to be no case law on point, the argument parallels 
the obviation of marking to recover full damages when there is no product 
at all to mark.  In both cases, the general public lacks access to any patented 
product and therefore cannot be misled into believing a patented product is 
free to copy.60  Appropriate judicial focus on the fundamental policy of 
section 287, to prevent innocent infringement, rather than mechanical 
adherence to its letter would support this approach to render marking 
unnecessary.61 
                                                     
58 See supra Part I.B. 
59 Whether a claim directed to enterprise software recites a product or method, 
or both, is often an arbitrary decision, at least when patentees target only users 
of the patented technology.  Artful drafting of substantive claim limitations can 
render differences between a product claim and a method claim largely a matter 
of form.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,771,303 (issued Aug. 3, 2004) (reciting 
method and apparatus claims formalistically differing only by preamble).  Of 
course, the distinction between product and method claims does substantively 
impact enforcement strategies targeting manufacturers of the patented 
technology, most notably competitors of the patentee.  See Burt Magen, Media 
Claims for Software Inventions, 20 NO. 11 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1, 2 
(Nov. 2003) (noting undesirable resort to contributory infringement allegation to 
target software maker or distributor). 
60 This result also promotes uniformity.  Because the presence of a single 
product claim may require patent notice when method claims alone do not, the 
scope of recoverable patent damages unreasonably turns on formality.  See 
supra ¶¶ 21-22 (explaining that without notice full damages are available for 
patents having only method claims but not patents having apparatus claims).  
61 The Federal Circuit has rejected rote application of section 287 in at least one 
other context.  See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 792 F.2d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).  Observing the futility of constructive notice to a U.S. government bound 
to non-patent strictures that render the government powerless to avoid 
infringement, the Motorola court explained: 
 
In light of [government procurement policy], a notice to the 
Government would be meaningless since the contracting agency must 
award the contract to the lowest bidder regardless of any patent 
infringement problems.  This policy, therefore, does not take into 
consideration a fundamental rationale supporting section 287—
supplying notice in order to prevent innocent infringement.  Wine 
Railway, 297 U.S. at 394 . . . .  Since the government does not consider 
the question whether the device it takes by eminent domain is protected 
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B.  Attempted Marking as Actual Notice to Licensees 
¶25 While a claim for increased damages by marking to accomplish 
constructive notice might prove unsuccessful, and a resort to ad hoc notice 
by letter inadequate, a secondary, alternate theory of actual notice may 
succeed in maximizing remedies against a discrete class of defendants: 
patented enterprise software licensees.  Case law provides that actual notice 
is not negated when the patent owner requests a license instead of ceasing 
the infringement.62  In an unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
a lower court holding that even a letter cautioning about future infringement 
could constitute actual notice.63  At least one federal district court has also 
recognized that acknowledgment by an accused infringer that it received 
notice establishes actual notice, even if the original notice was flawed.64  
¶26 This precedent informs issues of notice to licensees of marked 
enterprise software.  At a fundamental level, any license is a communication 
by the licensor patentee that certain activities are contractually permitted 
while all others, if undertaken in violation of the license, are prohibited and 
infringing.  If a licensed customer of patented enterprise software breaches 
the license, the customer may become a patent infringer as to its activities 
constituting the breach.65  In the event of such a breach, a typical enterprise 
                                                                                                                       
by patents or not, requiring a patent owner to mark his device or give 
notice pursuant to section 287 would be meaningless in this context.  
 
Id. at 771-72.    
62 See, e.g., SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (“Thus, the actual notice requirement of § 287(a) is satisfied when the 
recipient is informed of the identity of the patent and the activity that is believed 
to be an infringement, accompanied by a proposal to abate the infringement, 
whether by license or otherwise.”).   
63 CHISUM, supra note 30 at § 20.03[7][c][iv] n.179 (citing T.D. Williamson Inc. 
v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 606, (N.D. Okla. 1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 871 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (unpublished)) for proposition that a “cautionary” letter warning of, 
not past or present, but rather future patent infringement constitutes sufficient 
notice).  The Laymon court stated that “warning of infringement is not lessened 
because the act of infringement has not yet occurred; no law requires an 
infringement to have taken place prior to an effective notice of infringement.”  
Laymon, 723 F. Supp. at 606. 
64 Wokas v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 978 F. Supp. 839, 846 (N.D. Ind. 1997) 
(quoting Chubb Integrated Sys., Inc v. Nat’l Bank of Washington, 658 F. Supp. 
1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1987) for proposition that “[w]hen one acknowledges . . . 
that the adversary is claiming infringement, the law most certainly does not 
compel the patent owner to repeat it more explicitly”).  
65 For example, the licensee might appropriate a certain functionality of the 
enterprise software for the licensee’s own commercial product rather than limit 
its use of the patented product for internal purposes only, a typical restriction in 
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license could be deemed to satisfy the first, third, and fourth elements of 
actual notice, as identified by the Federal Circuit and set out in part II.B of 
this paper.66 
¶27 For example, a customer might continue to use the enterprise 
software in a manner otherwise permitted by the license, even after material 
breach by the customer and related notice by the owner to thereupon 
terminate its license to use.  Since a request for a license is a proper 
alternative to a charge of infringement, a consummated license agreement 
between the patentee and the infringer should be no less proper than a 
cautionary infringement charge, satisfying the first element of actual notice.  
With respect to the third and fourth elements, the license agreement serves 
as an express identification by the patentee and the infringer of the 
permitted and unpermitted activity and, as such, a cautionary charge of 
infringement regarding the latter.67  Countersignature on the license 
agreement by a licensee-turned-infringer could be deemed the infringer’s 
acknowledgment of the need for a license to the patented enterprise 
software.  Under applicable case law, such acknowledgment would excuse 
any defects in the ability of the license agreement to qualify as notice.68 
                                                                                                                       
enterprise software licenses.  See SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 12.02[c] 
(identifying common provisions in software licenses). 
66 Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (identifying requirements for actual notice). 
67 An enterprise software license agreement contains express statements about 
permissible use of the licensed software.  Very often, the license agreement also 
includes express restrictions or prohibitions regarding product use.  See, e.g., 
SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 12.02 (listing typical prohibitions in licensing 
agreements); Software License and Service Agreement between E.piphany, Inc. 
and eGroups, Inc., ¶ 2.2(B) (March 3, 2000), at 
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/egroups/epiphany.lic.2000.03
.03.html (“Customer agrees not to cause or permit the reverse engineering, 
disassembly or decompilation of Applications, except to the extent required to 
obtain interoperability with other independently created software or as specified 
by law.”).  Even when explicit identification of infringing activity is absent, it 
can be directly implied by the scope of the express license.  For example, what if 
the license expressly permitted only internal business use by the licensee, but the 
licensee, in fact, incorporated patented technology into its own product 
offerings?  Of course the more explicit the agreement provisions regarding 
activities constituting infringement, the more likely the license agreement could 
qualify as the required, albeit anticipatory, charge of infringement.  The 
E.piphany Agreement provides in pertinent part:  “E.piphany grants to Customer 
a nonexclusive license . . . to use the Applications solely for Customer's 
operations . . . Customer shall not copy or use the Applications . . . except as 
specified in this Agreement of this Order Form . . . .”  Id. at ¶¶ 2.1(A)-(B). 
68 Wokas, 978 F. Supp. at 846. 
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¶28 Identification of specific patents, the second element of actual 
notice, does not commonly appear in enterprise software license 
agreements.  However, a typical licensee learns of patent rights in the 
software by its access to the software or, more specifically, a screenshot or 
other location in which the attempted marking appears.69  The appearance of 
an infringed patent in a patent listing on some portion of enterprise software 
should constitute the required specific identification of infringed patents 
under actual notice principles.70 
¶29 Licensees of enterprise software can typically receive actual notice 
of patent rights.71  While delivery of notice to licensees as proposed may not 
precisely mirror the traditional provision of an infringement notice letter, 
licensees might receive as much patent infringement information as letter 
recipients.  In the absence of explicit case law on point, fairness favors 
recognition that, by virtue of their actual knowledge and ready access to 
patent notices otherwise invisible to the public at large, licensees should be 
subject to early damages liability.72 
                                                     
69 But see supra Part II.A (identifying significant risk in patent listings).  When 
the alleged infringement concerns excessive copies of the licensed software, all 
listed patents are implicated.  When alleged infringement involves 
misappropriation of a discrete patented functionality for use in, for example, the 
infringer’s own commercial offering, the infringer may struggle to know which 
of many patents listed in the software are at issue.  However, that struggle is no 
different from the public’s effective receipt of constructive notice from a large 
patent listing on a public product. 
70  While conventional marking of enterprise software would likely suffice to 
support a claim of actual notice, a patent listing in the license itself would 
perhaps more closely mirror the conventional notice letter containing both the 
infringement charge and the patents allegedly infringed in a single document.  
See Lans, 252 F.3d at 1327-28; Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187 (identifying requirements 
for actual notice).  Similarly, case law may not welcome notices that predate the 
onset of infringement.  But see CHISUM, supra note 30 at § 20.03[7][c][iv] n.179 
(citing T.D. Williamson Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 606, (N.D. Okla. 
1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 871 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (unpublished)) (discussing 
cautionary infringement notices).  To prepare for that possibility, patentees 
could consider making the license agreement available in the software for access 
during software use.  That way, notice could be deemed to be ongoing, with 
appearance of the license agreement at some point following infringement. 
71 Assigning knowledge of patents listed in concealed markings to non-licensees 
would be fundamentally inequitable.  See supra Part I.B (noting inability of the 
public to access patent markings). 
72 An actual notice finding in the enterprise software context should of course 
follow a highly fact-intensive inquiry with due consideration of the information 
imparted to the licensee-turned-infringer. 
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CONCLUSION 
¶30 Marking enterprise software in the conventional manner does not 
likely further the fundamental purpose of the marking statute.  For this 
reason, full recovery of damages based on mechanical compliance with 
section 287 is uncertain at best.  A primary, alternative theory to support 
damages unbounded by the delivery of notice is based on analogy between 
two situations: (1) patents under which no products are distributed to the 
public, and (2) the inaccessibility to the public of markings in enterprise 
software products, both rendering impossible a public deceived into 
believing that products are free to exploit.  A secondary, alternative theory 
based on actual notice may preserve full damages against licensees of 
patented enterprise software, even if such damages cannot be recovered 
against all infringers.  From their access to enterprise software, licensees 
can, and often do, learn pertinent information about applicable patent rights 
and should be held accountable for such knowledge.  Although case law has 
not squarely addressed these proposed notice theories, they are supported by 
the underlying objective of the marking statute, case law, and general 
principles of fairness. 
